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The Christian Left Still Lost

ONE of the sad features of recent years has been the apparent eclipse of the various Christian Left groups in this country. They have an honourable history, going back in various ways at least to F. D. Maurice and the Christian Socialist experiment he inspired. They have never been very numerous, but at different times have had an influence out of all proportion to their numbers. Indeed, before the war, in the mounting crisis of the thirties, anyone at all concerned with Christianity and the social order could hardly fail to come across them. But for some years now all this has changed. A Christian interested in these concerns to-day is hard put to it to know which (if any) of the various Socialist Christian groups still exist, However some do exist, and members of certain of them have been meeting in a public house in Bloomsbury, and have published their conclusions in a pamphlet called after their meeting place, *Papers from The Lamb* (pp. 26. The Malvern Press, 85, Dalston Lane, London, E.8; 1s. 3d., post free). It carries twenty-three signatures, including those of John Collins, Tom Driberg, John Groser, George MacLeod, Donald Soper and Mervyn Stockwood. In the light of the election result it is all the more interesting to see what they have to say. The election found the Labour Party not having had time properly to digest a considerable amount of re-thinking, and the process is obviously going to continue. What have these Christian Socialists to contribute?

The question is important, for we need a vigorous, radical alternative to Toryism in this country, and one that does not depend on economic crises to come to power. There were alarming signs at the election that a country which has never had it so good may be too disposed to sit at ease in Zion. It is also important that vigorous Christian thought should contribute to such a radical movement. Part of the eclipse of Christian Left thought may be due to the mood of the country (and of the Churches) being unfavourable, which would be deplorable. A good deal of it, however, is undoubtedly due to the irrelevance of much of the traditional thought of the Christian Left. For instance, few ideas have proved more erroneous than the illusions held about the Soviet Union by Conrad Noel and those influenced by him. No theology has been more severely criticized than that which equated the Kingdom of God with an ideal society of the future, which in turn could be equated with a socialist or co-operative Commonwealth. No economic theory has been more exploded than that which thought of the inherent contradictions of capitalist society bringing about an impasse which was bound to lead to its overthrow. All three of these positions were widely held in the Christian Left and tenaciously maintained, so

much so that the Christian Left ceased to count after 1939 because, in Tawney's famous stricture on the economic attitudes of the Church after the Reformation period, it ceased to think. We therefore approach this pamphlet with the more interest to see where the thinking of noteworthy representatives of Christian Socialist thought has got to. The result is disappointing. The old errors, though toned down, are still there, and there are not many signs of new thoughts for the changed situation.

1. It is still assumed that there is a social order demanded by the Christian faith, "a truly Christian society", to be worked for and achieved in the future.

2. It is assumed that common ownership is an essential feature of this society, and that the road to it is one "which all who profess and call themselves Christians have a duty to follow"; it is "a necessary Christian demand". The insight that power corrupts, which is quoted, is not rigorously applied to the locating of political and economic power in the same place.

3. The Soviet Union and China have, therefore, achieved one great *sine qua non* of the Socialist and (by implication) of the Christian society. (The Soviet Government is, however, criticized for ruthlessness at times; by a striking meiosis it is said that Christians are subject to "some" handicaps in Russia.)

4. This utopian outlook leads the authors to imagine that conflicts will in due course be removed from social, industrial and political life. Their main argument for common ownership is that it will prevent one group being thought superior to another. (It is good to note that talk of the inherent contradictions of capitalism has gone.) How this will be so is not made clear. "Healthy" competition is advocated (unlike "unhealthy" competition for profits). In fact there will always be conflicts of power in social structures, if only between those who give orders and those who receive them. The problem of manager and managed is always with us, and the problem is how to make the tussle between them creative for the common good, not to pretend it doesn't and won't exist. A paragraph which seems to envisage a considerable amount of workers' control in management does not come to grips with the inherent problems of management. A realistic theology must deal with the use of power, not dream of its abolition. There is much to be done in British industry at this point, and common ownership has little bearing on it.

Similarly in the section on international affairs (where differences between pacifists and non-pacifists have clearly been difficult to reconcile), it is said flatly that "Christians should now oppose all use of force in world affairs", though apparently most of the group supported the use of United Nations troops at Suez. This section sidesteps most of the tricky problems that Government and Opposition have to deal with.

5. Profit is still an evil word. Nowhere is the question faced whether under common ownership people are to be told what they can buy (or be given it), or whether they will to a large measure be left to decide themselves. In the latter case, how, except by some

market mechanism leading to the making of profits or losses, is it to be decided what goods and services are to be offered? Whether these profits and losses are made by private or public concerns is beside the point.

Again we need some criteria for deciding between communal and private enterprises. One of the criticisms of post-war British society is that desirable communal expenditure on roads, schools, houses, prisons, and hospitals, has been sacrificed to pressure for higher dividends and leap-frogging wage claims. No light is thrown upon that here.

The influence of past attitudes still surviving is shown interestingly in a confused section on Christian Unity. There is much caution expressed about "utopian" Re-union schemes, and a cautious and not entirely accurate reference to the Church of South India. Here the influence of high Anglicanism can be seen. On the other hand the Churches are called to find unity "by working together along the road of peace and social justice", a clear echo of fellow travelling language. In this way they will promote the Kingdom of God on earth. The section on racial equality, which says some good things, closes with a sentence which is so drastic that it needs elaboration. It may be true, but no evidence is offered: "Christians in Britain should insist that the great missionary societies, which constantly appeal for money from church people, should cease to operate a policy under which some of their agents are, in effect 'prison chaplains' proclaiming in the name of Christ capitulation to foreign rule".

The last section makes explicit a major error which lies behind the whole pamphlet, that ideally there should be an unanimous Christian mind on these issues. It says "the idea that Christians may and indeed ought to differ on the most important problems of society . . . represents one of the most successful invasions of the Christian consciousness by capitalism and individualism". "In most cases there is only one right answer, even though it may not be a simple answer." Only when in an utopian frame of thought particular economic systems are almost identified with sources of evil or good, is such an opinion plausible. Christianity is always in search of an economic system, as Whitehead said it was of a metaphysic. It certainly ought to cast a critical (as well as a conservative) eye on the changing scene, and at different times there may well be a strong presumption that changes of a certain kind should be advocated. But all these judgments have a contingent element arising out of what are considered the empirical data of the case, and what are thought to be the likely consequences of different lines of action. On both these there can be no certainty. Christian opinion may well differ within the broad conviction that Christians must seek to make the structures of life function in a just and humane way, and not merely concentrate on private virtues.

One can share the radical, equalitarian, humanitarian sentiments of the pamphlet, and its desire for more communal and less individualistic achievements, while at the same time regretting the

utopian elements in its thought, which account for its fundamentalism about common ownership and its lack of a theology of power. Furthermore, the whole pamphlet is extraordinarily insular. The intricate relation of British economic and political policy with the Continent and the Commonwealth, and as an affluent society with the undeveloped areas, is not raised. None of the fruitful social thinking of the Ecumenical Movement that went into Amsterdam and Evanston, and is going into the investigation of areas of rapid social change, has had any effect on it. Thinkers like the two Niebuhrs, Tillich, Barth, Brunner, John Bennett, Maritain, William Temple, and Demant, have contributed much to Christian social thought in the last quarter of a century, and all of them on the Left, but little trace of their influence can be found here.

The Christian Left will have to do better than this if it is to recover its lost influence.'

RONALD PRESTON.

Authority and the Development of Doctrine

IN this article I wish to discuss the problems which arise in connexion with Roman Catholic theories on the development of doctrine under an infallible developing authority, and to examine some of the consequences of saying that the doctrine about this authority is itself one of the doctrines which are developing.

That God reveals himself, and not propositions about himself, is a commonplace of much modern theology—not least of Roman Catholic theology. We are told, and I do not wish to challenge it for the purpose of this article, that while dogmatic pronouncements are in some way or other tentative, either through incompleteness or inaccuracy, revelation is whole and constant; beneath all our theological formulations there is some real hard rock, and that rock is Christ. In Roman Catholic theology this distinction is particularly noticeable among those who hold ideas of doctrinal development; indeed, unless they maintain the distinction they are forced to say that revelation itself develops.

"Revelation is not a series of carefully compiled propositions, it is something much more complex and deeper; its formulation in *de fide* propositional definitions represents indeed without error the truth of the *res revelata*, but it does not exhaust the richness and depth that it contains. The deposit of faith *is* revelation",[2] so writes

[1] Since this was written the various Christian Left groups have held a joint meeting and set up an unified organization with Dr Donald Soper as chairman.

[2] *Blackfriars*, November 1958, p. 450. For another example of a Roman Catholic theologian on the nature of revelation, see Romano Guardini, *The Faith and Modern Man*, pp. 138 f. Also Father Victor White, discussing the view of Aquinas, writes: "He is quite clear as to the distinction between Revelation and subsequent (even Divinely assisted) recording of Revelation in the Scriptures. Distinct again are the articles of the Church's faith, her dogmas, which are immediately and directly not 'revelations' but statements of *our* faith in God as revealed to the prophets and personally in Christ." (*Blackfriars*, March 1944, p. 114.) Other theologians seem to confuse doctrine and revelation;

Father Henry St John in a recent article. Thus, although propositions of theology are not thought of as in the fullest sense part of revelation, they are divinely given. Newman, the great leader and prophet of the developmentists—as I shall call those theologians who hold theories of doctrinal development—declares that God is something more than that "assemblage of notions" which is the catholic faith. "Particular propositions, then," he continues, "which are used to express portions of the great idea vouchsafed to us, can never really be confused with the idea itself." Theological propositions give us no more idea—and no less—of God as he really is, than our senses give of matter as it really is.[1]

Newman then passes to the question: "How can teaching and intercourse, how can human words, how can earthly images, convey to the mind an idea of the Invisible?"[2] It was, in his view, only gradually that the Church could, by God's guidance, make explicit all those things in the *depositum fidei* which she had kept and pondered in her heart. Yet it is not purely a matter of language, nothing is, all forms of thought are to some extent determined, or at least influenced, by our forms of expression; it would be interesting to inquire in what sense it is meaningful—under the old static conception—to assert that dogmas (as opposed to historical facts) can be believed though unstated. In the very restricted sense of thinking in the form of propositions without actually speaking or writing them down, it is meaningful, but this is certainly not the sense in which the early Church can be said to have believed the doctrines of Nicea. It is a realization of this fact that led Newman to the idea of development. When the Church defines a doctrine, according to the developmentist, it is not merely a question of stating in language a belief already held, but in a real sense, an instance of the Church making up her mind. George Tyrrell emphasized this in pointing out the distinction between "potential" and "implicit". In the old orthodoxy, definition was merely a matter of making explicit an actual though previously unstated belief, something taken for granted. "If I say that I attended a friend's funeral it is not necessary to say that he is dead. That is stated implicitly. Yet it is not my potential, but my actual, belief; my actual belief in his death is implied in my actual belief in his burial. There are many more or less remote consequences of his death which I could, but do not, infer. These I believe potentially but not actually—i.e. I do *not*

Dom Cary Elwes, for example, speaks of "the doctrine of the Holy Trinity" as being "revealed to men by Christ" (*The Sheepfold and the Shepherd*, p. 184). Unless there be new revelation, which Rome rejects, this view cannot be held together with a doctrine of development. (I.e. Was the definition of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity merely a matter of *writing down* what was already believed? If so, there was no development; if not, there was new revelation.)

[1] *Oxford University Sermons*, No. 15. Newman would probably not go all the way with Mansel in declaring that the actual revelation of God is, "that under which he has been pleased to reveal himself", rather than "as he is". (*The Limtis of Religious Thought*, p. 18.) Newman is speaking of the language in which it is expressed.

[2] Ibid., No. 15.

believe them."[1] Or again, Tyrrell writes, "Under this confusion between evolution as an unfolding of actual packed-up parts, and evolution as epigenesis or growth of new parts contained virtually in a germ, recent theologians have claimed the authority of S. Vincent of Lerins and of the Council of Florence for an entirely new conception of doctrinal evolution, in flat contradiction to the ancient idea of doctrinal identity."[2] The greater difficulty in judging the validity of growth from a germ, than in judging the validity of the contents of a box being unpacked, is obvious. Newman would more than agree with Mr Gladstone about the "great fallacy of allowing what are called logical consequences in theological doctrine. Human language is only adequate to a very partial expression of Divine truth; and we must often stop resolutely where the Catholic Faith places us, and decline to follow even arguments of which we cannot at the moment detect the flaw."[3] If human reason be not the judge, what is?

Newman speaks of "the notion of development under infallible authority".[4] This is the answer. It is true that in the *Essay of Development* Newman puts forward certain tests to judge a valid development from a corruption, but these are readily confessed by him to be inadequate, and have a definite flavour of *ad hoc* principles invented to justify the Roman developments. The real warrant is to be found in the infallibility of the Church or, for Roman Catholics since the Vatican Council, of the papacy as the final court of appeal.[5] The knowledge of the deposit of faith, writes Father St John in the article before quoted, "resides in the mind of the Church and is interpreted by its authority, which has power to determine by divine guidance whether any particular doctrine is or is not a genuine component of the deposit and therefore revealed truth."[6] And within the Church the pope is regarded *ex sese, non ex con-*

[1] *Christianity at the Crossroads,* p. 19.

[2] Ibid., p. 18 n.

[3] *Letters on Church and Religion of William Ewart Gladstone,* by D. C. Lathbury, ii, p. 180.

[4] *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine,* 1:2:2:14. True, Newman is discussing the infallibility of the *church,* but he declares in a footnote to the 1878 edition that the Vatican Council's determination that the pope, *ex cathedra,* has the same infallibility as the church "does not affect the argument in the text" (1:2:2:11).

[5] Professor Chadwick argues that, in the *Essay,* Newman had, as a criterion of the body with true developments, the idea of nearness to the early church. Yet the argument of the *Essay* is not merely: "The less mutability has occurred the truer is the modern church: but since history shows that *some* mutability has occurred, even in the least mutable of churches, we need a theory . . ." (*From Bossuet to Newman,* p. 144); but also "Mutability has occurred, this leads to the antecedent probability of an infallible interpreting authority, the Roman church is the only body to claim this explicitly, therefore . . ." And, after all, he does say that "to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often" (*Essay,* 1:1:1:7). Modern Roman developmentists have taken this rather sad recognition of the situation "here below" of the conservative Newman, however, and transformed it into a positive passion for movement. Development is "a phenomenon of vitality" and protestantism is condemned for not having developed. (B. C Butler, *The Church and Infallibility,* p. 6.)

[6] *Blackfriars,* November 1958, p. 448.

sensu ecclesiae, as the possessor of this infallibility, as the final court of judgment.

Yet, we may ask, has this view of the papacy always been held? Was the pope always thought of as the final court of appeal in matters of faith and morals? Did St Peter think of himself as infallible, *ex sese*, when making pronouncements on faith and morals? Did the other apostles regard him as such? Did the early Church think of the Bishop of Rome as present-day Roman Catholics think of the pope? Newman quotes Isaac Barrow with approval, "The state of the most primitive Church did not well admit such an universal sovereignty."[1] There is no need to quote modern Roman Catholic writers, who quite openly state that the idea of papal infallibility is of very slow and gradual growth. Did the very early Church, then, admit papal infallibility? They would no more have admitted it than the assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. It was, we are told by Roman Catholic theologians, potential in what they believed already; but asked point blank whether they believed it or no, they would, as likely as not, have kicked you in the pants, saying that they had more important things to think about. "Ah," replies the developmentist, "of course they did not actually believe it, this is one of the doctrines which is developing." Now at this point, I must confess, I get rather lost. We are told that dogma develops, and that the understanding of the ultimate criterion of the development and of the instrument by which its development becomes explicit is also developing. What, then, is the criterion of the truth or falsity of the criterion and instrument of development itself?

May I indicate the position we have reached by means of a short dialogue?

Questioner: When the Church defines a doctrine, is this a doctrine which is already believed though not stated?

Developmentist: No. Many doctrines which are now *de fide* were not believed in the early Church, and the Vincentian Canon is insufficient to explain the facts.

Q: Would you accept the distinction between "implicit"—believed though not stated, and "potential"—not actually believed, but deducible as a necessary or permissible inference from what is already believed?

D: Yes; not only did many people in the early Church not believe certain doctrines which are now *de fide*, but there is evidence that, if asked, they would have rejected them.

[1] *Essay*, 1:4:3:6. Although the Inquisition condemned the following proposition, that "Simon Peter never suspected that the primacy of the church was entrusted to him by Christ" (*Lamentabili*, 1907), things seem to have developed since then; many Roman Catholic theologians appear to hold pretty well this view. They would probably say that although the primacy was accepted from apostolic days, the understanding of what primacy involves has developed (see e.g. Cary Elwes, op. cit., p. 208). But what significance a belief in the primacy without any idea of what the primacy involves has, I am not sure. If the New Testament is anything to go by, the understanding of the primacy is so "undeveloped" that the whole concept of primacy is hardly applicable.

Q: Is there not a danger in accepting logically deducible conclusions from theological premises, owing to the peculiar nature of theological language?

D: Certainly; but logical entailment is not the supreme test of the validity of developments. The biological analogy is more apt than logical method, and the definitions of the pope are the guarantee.

Q: Would the early Church have recognized this doctrine of papal infallibility?

D: Probably not; the Abbot of Downside is prepared to say that the operation and recognition of papal prerogatives, even as late as the fourth century, were "as hard to discern as the rationality of the human baby, or the wings of a caterpillar".[1]

Q: Then you would say that it was potential rather than implicit.

D: Yes; if asked, many Christians of the very early Church would have rejected it. Nevertheless, there was an infallible authority on earth even though this was not recognized.

Q: It is certainly possible to conceive of an infallible authority pre-existing the acknowledgement of its infallibility, but the argument for the antecedent probability of an infallible authority demands that this authority should be recognized to be infallible. If Newman could not conceive of God's allowing the Church to exist without an infallible guide, how could he imagine God's allowing this guide to be unrecognized by all Christians for some of their history, and by some Christians for all of their history? What, then, was the final authority in the early Church, before the papacy was recognized as such? Who is to decide on the validity of developments when knowledge about the authority for deciding this is also developing? Why are the Roman developments true and all others false? On what authority do you claim that your authority for deciding development is a truer development than that of others?

D: At first the infallibility of the Church was accepted and gradually it came to be realized that the organ of this infallibility was the papacy. So the authority has been made more specific under the infallible authority of the consent of the whole Church. The organic continuity of the body in which the doctrine is developing is the guarantee.

Q: It is not easy to see what exactly is demanded by the criterion of the consent of the Church. I suppose that the final authority would have been a general council. Nevertheless, it is certain that the infallibility of the Church was not regarded as residing in the papacy in the early Church, and large numbers of Christians were unrepresented at the council which defined the dogma.

D: The fact that the early Church did not recognize the doctrine does not worry me, as it is a doctrine which has developed. Certainly heretics and schismatics were not represented at the Vatican Council.

[1] B. C. Butler, *The Church and Infallibility*, p. 6.

Q: Why do you call Orthodox and Anglican Christians heretics and schismatics?

D: Because they are not in communion with the see of Rome.

Q: Was communion with the see of Rome explicitly regarded as a sufficient and necessary condition of orthodoxy in the very early Church?

D: Not explicitly—although there are signs of its being used as a test. This criterion of orthodoxy is one which has developed.

Q: There are many seeds and signs in the early Church, and it is only possible, on your theory, to discover these by looking backwards and seeing them in the light of later developments. But by doing this you are assuming these developments to be valid, and this is the question which we are discussing. If you hold that doctrines develop, and that an infallible authority is necessary to determine the validity of these developments, and that knowledge about this authority is developing, I want to know what authority determines the development of this. You have told me that the consent of the Church is this authority, but have demonstrated that the development of the universal jurisdiction and infallibility of the pope is a valid one, only by assuming the principle itself—surely a *petitio principii.* You cannot show the idea of papal infallibility to be validly confirmed by the consent of the Church without accepting a view of the Church which assumes the papal claims. "While, then, on the one hand," writes Newman in the Essay, "it is probable that some means will be granted for ascertaining the legitimate and true developments of Revelation, it appears, on the other, that these means must of necessity be external to the developments themselves."[1] This may be true with the infallibility of the Church, but it most certainly is not true of the infallibility of the pope; this is a real development, or "discovery".[2] We are forbidden by R.C. theology to get out of the difficulty by saying that primacy and infallibility really belong to the Church and have been delegated to the pope.[3] If organic continuity of the body in which doctrine is developing is the essential factor, this lets through the Eastern and Anglican churches at least—you can hardly deny them *organic* continuity. On what grounds are their developments or lack of developments condemned by you?

"There can be no such thing as . . . *progressive development,*" declared Mansel, the sceptic. "We can test the progress of knowledge, only by comparing its successive representations with the objects

[1] *Essay,* 1:2:2:3. The Archbishop of York seems to overlook this point when discussing Scripture as the test of developments: "Developments thus took place, but they were *all* tested. . . . These tests are summed up in the scriptures. . . . Hence, while the Canon of Scripture is in itself a development, it has a special authority to control and to check the whole field of development in life and doctrine" (*The Gospel and the Catholic Church,* p. 64, my italics). A thing cannot be its own test, because it could not conceivably fail; and if it is logically impossible to fail, it is not a test at all.

[2] The word is that of Cary Elwes (op. cit., p. 208).

[3] For primacy see *Pastor Aeternus* (Denzinger, 1822). Journet argues that this also applies to infallibility (*Church of the Word Incarnate,* i, p. 440).

which they profess to represent: and as the object in this case is inaccessible to human faculties, we have no criterion by which to distinguish between progress and mere fluctuation."[1] The writers on "Authority" in *Essays Catholic and Critical* would not have accepted this, believing that dogmas can be verified by experience, but Newman could hardly join them. If this were so, whither scepticism as the basis of an infallible authority? If dogmas can be tested by experience, an infallible authority is, at best, a superfluous luxury.

The doctrine of development, as used by many Roman Catholic theologians since Newman, seems merely to have been employed to justify the *status quo* in the Roman Church. All things are possible, and if things get a little difficult to justify in terms of development, what is to prevent the doctrine of development itself from developing, to allow more scope.[2] How conservative are the views of Tyrrell, when compared with those of Newman. The modernist writer argues that, while theology must change and develop as a science, revelation and even the understanding of revelation remains constant from age to age. "The advantage of later over earlier ages is merely secondary and protective—a compensation for their growing disadvantage. As time goes on the preservation of the original 'idea' needs more complex defences against oblivion and distortion. As the initial force lessens, it needs to be husbanded more carefully."[3] With Newman, understanding increases as time goes on, and we find ourselves driven to adopt an almost patronizing attitude to what amounts to the invincible ignorance of St Peter and the apostles.[4] Writing of the

[1] *The Limits of Religious Thought*, pp. 257–8.

[2] It is, however, widely proclaimed that the pope is limited in what he can define. "The pope can neither define things contrary to the revealed deposit, nor things outside it" (Journet, op. cit., i, p. 559). Yet when we come to ask how it is possible to discover what is in the deposit, we are somewhat bewildered: "The ultimate and decisive determinant of what is contained in revelation is the Apostolic See of Rome" (Henry St John, *Blackfriars*, November 1955, p. 412). The limitation is, for practical purposes, a bogus one. Developing organisms have been known to grow "wens, biles, and apostemes", but on the Roman theory there is no way of telling whether this has happened; there can be no way of criticizing developments; what is, is best. Father St John pays his respects to sound learning and swiftly passes on (*Blackfriars*, November 1955, p. 412).

[3] *Christianity at the Crossroads*, pp. 32–3.

[4] Or perhaps not the apostles, but St Linus and the second generation, as it is widely held by Roman Catholic theologians that the apostles were in the fortunate position of knowing all the dogmas which have been and will be defined by the church. There is, however, a difference as to whether they knew them explicitly or implicitly. Marin Sola argues that the apostles had these dogmas before their minds "not merely in a mediate, virtual or implicit manner, but immediately, formally, explicitly" (*L'évolution homogène du dogme catholique*, i, p. 57); while Newman declares that in his opinion some of these dogmas were before their minds only "in confuso or implicité" (*Birmingham Oratory MSS*, A:43:12; printed in *Journal of Theological Studies*, October 1958, p. 334). If the former view be accepted, why, we may ask, did they not tell their contemporaries or write it down? If "immediately", "formally", and "explicitly" mean anything at all, they mean that this would be possible. But, according to Journet, this is one of the questions which we must not ask (op. cit., i, p. 134).

history of an idea, Newman declares, "Its beginnings are no measure of its capabilities, nor of its scope. At first no one knows what it is, or what it is worth."[1] "Must we not," demands Tyrrell of those who hold that the understanding of the idea, as well as the mere formulation of it in theological propositions develops from age to age, "Must we not regard the apostolic age, when all these deduced dogmas were confused and indiscernible, as one of relative darkness and chaos?"[2] The modernist can face this dilemma squarely, but can the developmentist?

The conclusion of this argument, then, is neither that doctrines do not develop, nor that the pope cannot be infallible, but merely that Newman's argument for the antecedent probability of an infallible developing authority is invalid if the doctrine about this authority is also developing, and that once it be admitted that papal infallibility was not a belief of the early Church, claim to a constant standard of true and false developments is abandoned. These are some of the problems which the developmentist must face, and they lead to speculation as to whether the "Newmania" which is afflicting the Roman Church at the present time is an influence wholly for good. "I may say," wrote Lord Acton, "Read Newman, he is by far the best writer the Church of Rome has had in England since the Reformation. And the pupil will come back and say: But do you think his arguments sound, or his religion Catholic? I shall have to say: No; if you work it out, it is a school of Infidelity."[3]

DAVID NICHOLLS.

The Concept of Miracle for To-day

THE scope of this exposition on miracle will be limited: a selection of the miracles of Jesus as reported in the Synoptic Gospels will be made: not indeed a random selection but chiefly those eleven miracles which are attested by all Synoptic Evangelists.[4] These indeed constitute the whole problem; as A. B. Bruce says, "The eleven Synoptic miracles . . . cover the whole apologetic ground."[5]

This source material, the eleven common Synoptic miracles, must therefore first of all be examined. Probably the most representative of these miracles is that reported in Mark 2. 1–12. In this miracle there are, for the present purpose, at least four important elements. There is the element of faith in those who brought the paralytic: there is offence in some of the onlookers: Jesus uses the Messianic title "Son of Man"—already in his ministry pointing forward to his

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[1] *Essay*, 1:1:1:7.
[2] *Scylla and Charybdis*, p. 8.
[3] *Correspondence of the First Lord Acton* (ed. Figgis and Laurence), p. 227.
[4] References are to Mark 1. 30 f.; 1. 40 ff.; 2. 1 ff.; 3. 1 ff.; 4. 36 ff.; 5. 1 ff.; 5. 25 ff.; 5. 22 ff.; 6. 35 ff.; 9. 14 ff.; 10. 46 ff.
[5] *The Miraculous Element in the Gospels*, p. 131.

reinterpretation of "Messiah" in his own office of sin-bearing (v. 10 "the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins"): and lastly, the death of Jesus is foreshadowed in that it is the Scribes who are offended. In the other ten common Synoptic miracles these four dominant notes are sounded with differing emphases. In other miracles, faith is more stressed: e.g. Mark 5. 25 ff., the woman is sought out personally—"Thy faith hath made thee whole." Another example of this is the Feeding of the Five Thousand (Mark 6. 35 ff.) —here the emphasis on the disciples is striking—"How many loaves have *ye* . . . He commanded *them* to make all sit . . . gave them to *his disciples* to set before them." It is as much a feeding of the disciples as of the multitude, deepening the disciples' experience of the life of the Kingdom. Again, in other miracles the offence of the by-standers, while some are growing in faith, is more marked: e.g. the healing of the Withered Hand (Mark 3. 1 ff.)—"for the hardness of their hearts": and here his death is foreshadowed ("The Pharisees took counsel . . . how they might destroy him"). The reinterpretation of the Messianic title is made explicit in the miracle of the Cleansing of the Leper (Mark 1. 40 ff.): this is a symbolic act of Jesus the sin-bearer; the leper's disease was regarded as evidencing his sinfulness and rendered him an outcast according to the Law (Lev. 13. 46). Jesus touches the leper, takes his defilement upon himself and enables the sinner to perform the Law. As Dr Alan Richardson remarks, herein is foreshadowed the new Messiahship of grace by the death of the Messiah, "the whole Pauline doctrine of justification by faith is expounded in this short pericope".[1]

This examination of the common Synoptic miracles shows that the effect of miracle is two-fold. Miracle brings all who are concerned to decision either for or against the worker of them, e.g. the woman with the issue deepened her faith, the Pharisees took counsel against him: and secondly, by his miracles Jesus is revealed as God in man to his faithful followers. For convenience and clarity, let us call the demand of miracle for decision its *apologetic* function; and the fact that Jesus uses miracle as an instrument of revelation, its *apocalyptic* function. Let me say at once, that these terms for the two-fold effect of miracle will be used in strictly limited senses. "Apologetic" will be used simply as a heading for our consideration of the testing impact of miracle on those outwith Jesus' followers: "apocalyptic" will be used, not in the more usual sense of veiled symbolism concerning the millennium, but simply as a title for the deepening understanding of Jesus which his miracles give to those who, having chosen to follow him, enter into ever closer personal relationship with him. The apologetic effect of miracle is illustrated by Kierkegaard: "A miracle can make one attentive—now thou art in a state of tension, and all depends upon what thou dost choose, offence or faith . . . The contradiction in which consists the possibility of offence is the fact of (Christ) being an individual man, a lowly man —and then acting in a way suggestive of being God." . . . "(Christ's)

[1] *The Miracle-Stories of the Gospels*, p. 61.

absolute unrecognizableness is this: being God, to be also an individual man . . . the profoundest incognito."[1] The apologetic function of miracle—wrought by Jesus in the Divine incognito, brings men to the tension of choosing faith or offence. If the choice is to place faith in him, the miracle opens up its second function, that of apocalyptic, revealing God to the chooser; the miracle becomes a part of the revelation. This double apologetic/apocalyptic reference is to be seen throughout the Synoptic miracles—the jealous guarding of the Divine incognito so that each may make his choice himself; e.g. the injunction to silence placed on the cleansed leper (Mark 1. 44).

But not only does the Synoptic material reveal the two-fold effect of miracle, it also yields a definition of miracle. It is apparent that for a biblical definition of miracle, any statement involving the terminology of scientific/theological controversy must be avoided. The age in which our Lord lived was innocent of any such scientific dogma as, e.g. the fixity of natural law. For the contemporary of Jesus, miracle might be expected every day. Thus J. H. Bernard's definition of miracle is partly very helpful and partly unacceptable —"A miracle (is) . . . an event manifesting purpose, occurring in the physical world, which cannot be accounted for by any of its known forces, and which, therefore, we ascribe to a spiritual cause: . . . it is at once a *τέρας* and a *σημεῖον*."[2] The premiss on which his "and which therefore" depends is quite foreign to the language of biblical times. But he is helpful in distinguishing *τέρας* ("wonder") and *σημεῖον* ("sign"). A wonder, the person of the first century expected daily: but a sign was different—it was something pointing to the nature of God and to his intervention in the history of men. Therefore the biblical definition of miracle is "an unusual or unprecedented event revealing something of the nature of God". The interesting question that remains is: against what standard did our Lord's contemporaries judge his actions to be unprecedented or unusual? In my opinion, the norm was an experimental one; cp. Jesus' own "definition" of his miracles (John 15. 24): "If I had not done among them the works *which none other man did* . . ."—a "definition" frequently repeated by those who witnessed his miracles (cp. Mark 2. 12). What made Jesus' miracles especially unprecedented in man's experience was their sign element. And so St John continues (15. 24): "If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin: but now have they both seen and hated *both me and my Father.*" This is exactly the offence of which Kierkegaard speaks: they are willing to accept the wonders but that any sign/apocalyptic element should be found in the works of this Man, they cannot accept. Miracles are therefore on the biblical definition two-fold entities: wonders/signs. Paul Tillich helps us grasp the significance of the Biblical miracles and the frame of mind which it is necessary to have to accept them in their fully

[1] *Training in Christianity*, pp. 99 and 127.
[2] Art. "Miracle", Hastings' *D. B.*, III. 384a.

apocalyptic function. Miracles, he finds,[1] have three elements—first, miracle is an astonishing, unusual, shaking event; second, it points to the mystery of being expressing its relation to us in a definite way; third, it is received as a sign-event in an ecstatic experience. We might call the first element, along with an inkling of the second, the apologetic function of miracle; and the second and third elements, the apocalyptic function of miracle. Tillich sums up his position thus,[2] "Miracles are . . . an ecstatically received understanding of constellations of factors which point to the divine Ground of Being." We are now in a position to make the following enunciation about miracle as being in full accord with the Synoptic source material: miracle in the full apocalyptic meaning of the term is a wonder/sign event revelatory of the nature of God to those with a faith to receive it in an ecstatic experience: miracle in the apologetic sense is a wonder, which demands a fragmentary realization that the Mystery of Being is expressing itself in a relation to man in a definite way, creating a tension to choose offence or faith in Jesus "acting in a way suggestive of being God".

We shall now concern ourselves with some of the implications of this dual enunciation about miracle. Let us therefore begin with the apologetic implications of miracles. Jesus worked events unprecedented in the experience of his age which brought men to the point of decision about his claim to be God. In what sense were they apologetic in his own day? They were obviously a valuable vehicle of communication, to judge from their prominent place in the Gospels. It has been held, indeed, that Jesus, in order to gain a hearing for himself, had to clothe his message in miracles, as these were part of the prophetic expectation of the Messiah, and also an inseparable element of popular cosmology. That there is at least some truth in this contention, is to be seen from Bultmann's survey of the cosmology of New Testament times in the first paragraph of his essay "New Testament and Mythology". "Miracles are by no means rare. Man is not in control of his own life. Evil spirits may take possession of him." Therefore, in reply to the question: why did Jesus work miracles? we must answer under this apologetic heading: because he intended to assert in intelligible terms that the Messianic age had arrived. But always Jesus' miracles are subordinate to the Kerygma itself: there is a close connexion with the preaching of the Kingdom, cp. Matt. 11. 1–6, 21; Luke 9. 1, 2. This is the apologetic function of Jesus' miracles in his day—wonders, with the claim that they are worked by authority of God.

But now we are faced with the question, can we in modern times accept without modification this first century apologetic use of miracle? Bultmann points us uncompromisingly in the way which we must go—"When we preach the Gospel to-day, (do) we expect our converts to accept not only the Gospel message, but also the mythical view of the world in which it is set (?) . . . Theology must undertake the task of stripping the Kerygma from its mythical

[1] *Systematic Theology*, I, 128 ff. [2] Op. cit., II, 186.

framework, of 'demythologizing' it."[1] Bultmann is surely right. We cannot allow potential believers to be offended by an outworn cosmology rather than be presented with the possibility of offence at Jesus who claims to be God. Bultmann again asks,[2] "Can the Kerygma be interpreted apart from mythology?" Can it indeed? How far can we go with Bultmann in his wholesale clearance of myth? Bonhoeffer can help us here: "You cannot, as Bultmann imagines, separate God and miracles, but you do have to be able to interpret and proclaim *both* of them in a 'non-religious' sense."[3] The problem of present-day Christian apologetic is not to discard the miracles, but to reinterpret them to the world of to-day. But we cannot reinterpret miracles without first finding the meaning of the Kingdom of God for to-day. To put it clearly, we cannot reinterpret the wonders until we have examined the meaning of the signs to be conveyed. Therefore, before we attempt to indicate any reinterpretation of the miracles for modern apologetic, we must first examine the apocalyptic content of miracles which we intend to convey.

From our study of the Synoptic material, it appears that it is in its apocalyptic reference that miracle is revealed in its full richness. As Tillich puts it, "ecstatically received understanding of consellations of factors pointing to the divine Ground of Being". The meaning of this statement is best illustrated by that section of St Mark (6. 30—8. 30) which Richardson calls the "Opening of the Blind Eyes".[4] This is the section in which Jesus is gradually revealed as Christ. He feeds his disciples by using them in the work of his Kingdom (miracle of the Five Thousand); he preserves his people from danger (Mark 6. 47–52); and the whole section culminates in the opening of Peter's eyes in the confession (8. 29), "Thou art the Christ". This is the ecstatic reception of constellations of factors by the disciples, factors both external to them and in their minds, pointing to Jesus as the Christ, the Son of God. Immediately upon this reception, the apologetic caution is given (8. 30), "He charged them that they should tell no man of him"; he can be revealed only to an ecstatic experience created by his gracious activity. And now miracle becomes part of revelation itself. Jesus is recognized as Messiah and immediately the miracles are seen to be interpretative of his Messiahship. He does not interpret his Messiahship in terms of triumph: he transforms the concept. Even at the beginning of his ministry he points to his interpretation of his office, not simply healing, but teaching, sin-bearing, dying, cp. Luke 4. 18 f. Thus A. B. Bruce sums up: "The most satisfactory view to take of these (healing) miracles is to regard them as the forthflowing of that love which, according to the prophetic oracles, was the chief Messianic charism."[5] And further, the miracles do not simply reveal the character of the Messiah but the very nature of his Kingdom. The miracles of Jesus are the miracles of the Kingdom of God, which, with his coming, is already in being, cp. Luke 11. 20. Belief in the

[1] *New Testament and Mythology*, p. 3.
[2] Op. cit., p. 15.
[3] *Letters and Papers from Prison*, p. 125.
[4] Op. cit., p. 98.
[5] Op. cit., p. 258.

miracles becomes belief in the whole eschatology of the Divine Kingdom. For the first Christians, the apocalyptic of the miracles was the revelation of the new Messiahship of love, and the Kingdom of God, to be fulfilled but present even now. As Richardson says, "The early Church's belief in miracles through the power of the Holy Spirit was an expression of her eschatological faith."[1]

For the meaning of this eschatological faith for the world of to-day, we turn again to Bonhoeffer's statement: "You have to be able to interpret and proclaim both of them (God and miracles) in a 'non-religious' sense." Bonhoeffer later clarifies this reinterpretation of God in a "non-religious" sense: "man's religiosity makes him look in his distress to the power of God in the world: he uses God as a *Deus ex machina*. The Bible directs him to the powerlessness and suffering of God; only a suffering God can help."[2] How is this powerlessness of God and his weakness effective; how can a suffering God help? Again Tillich may help us, "God's presence and power should be sought . . . in the power of the New Being to overcome the self-destructive consequences of existential estrangement in and through the created structures of reality."[3] It is not God omnipotent, *Deus ex machina*, but God redeeming and dying in the world. And it is partly from the apocalyptic of miracle that this truth is revealed. Tillich continues that same statement, "If taken in this sense, the miracles of Jesus as the Christ belong to the symbols of victory and corroborate the central symbol of the Resurrection." This is the eschatological faith created by the apocalyptic function of miracle: the death, suffering, weakness, triumph of Christ are present by reference in all his relationships with his community, e.g. the death is present in the healing of the man with the withered hand (Mark 3. 1–6). The supreme example is in John 11. 1–54. Here Jesus is shown as the life-giver: but in giving life to Lazarus he causes his own death (v. 47): and to this miracle belongs the saying on the eschatological kingdom (vv. 25, 26), "I am the resurrection and the life: . . . whosoever liveth and believeth (*present* participles) in me shall never die." Miracles are therefore the treasured apocalyptic possession of the eschatological community: treasured, because the wealth of the revelation is contained in them. The healings reveal Christ as the Divine sin-bearer and show his Messianic charism of love: the nature miracles show his care over his community, or the superabundant excellence of the eschatological kingdom. Richardson sums up the apocalyptic of miracles: "They are for the Christian no dead records of wonders of an age that is past . . . but parables of the dealings of the living Christ, with those who trust Him and obey His word."[4]

Having now indicated the modern reinterpretation of the signs involved in miracle, we must again take up the earlier task of indicating the modern wonders which will act as the apologetic for this understanding of the eschatological kingdom. Are we in this

[1] *The Miracle-Stories of the Gospels*, p. 40. [2] Op. cit., p. 164.
[3] Op. cit., II, 186. [4] Op. cit., p. 136 f.

age to use the wonders of miracle as apologetic unchanged from the New Testament way? I would suggest that to continue to use the wonders simpliciter is to make a grave error. There is an element of once-for-all-ness in the appearance of Christ in the world. The world and God through Christ are now in a new relationship: Christ's miracles were part of his once-for-all action and therefore cannot simply be his apologetic in this post-Incarnation age: his relation to the world is something larger. The apologetic for this larger relationship, implied in the apocalyptic of miracle itself, in so far as the Resurrection is foreshadowed in his miracles, demands something correspondingly larger. However precious the apocalyptic material of the miracles may be to his eschatological community, we cannot use the apologetic wonders of these signs simpliciter in the present world.

We must therefore attempt to reinterpret the wonders of miracle. But we have firm ground on which to base our attempt. Tillich writes: "The original miracle, together with its original reception, is the permanent point of reference."[1] It is a wonder suitable to this larger relationship of Jesus to the world which we are concerned to find, always referring back to the original miracles and their original reception. In the Farewell Discourses in St John's Gospel, our Lord discloses his larger relationship with his eschatological community: "Verily, I say unto you, he that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do; because I go unto my Father . . . and I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter."[2] This is the larger relationship of the ascended Christ with his eschatological community, expressed in "greater works than I do" by means of the Holy Spirit's activity. The greater works that we can do are in consequence of our having the Spirit of God in us. The wonders we work for this larger relationship are the wonders of the Spirit. The people's opinion of Jesus, the people who were the object of his wonders, was, "We never saw it on this fashion" (Mark 2. 12)—not because they saw something utterly new (they were used to wonders) but because they had never before seen wonders worked with divine authority. Our wonders are not in the working of something utterly new and staggering, but in meeting the world in the familiar ways of everyday life with the authority of the Holy Spirit. Bonhoeffer writes, "The Christian hope sends a man back to his life on earth in a wholly new way."[3] But it is back to his life that a man is sent. This is our wonder: the new way under the Holy Spirit. It may include miracle as God leads us, but it is something infinitely more diverse than miracle; the charisms of the Holy Spirit are not stereotyped. St Paul enumerates these gifts in 1 Cor. 12. 8–10. And chief of these is the more excellent way—love.

What is the concept of miracle which must be held for to-day? Within the Christian community the miracles as reported in the

[1] *Systematic Theology*, I, 140.
[2] John, 14. 12, 16.
[3] Op. cit., p. 154.

Gospels are the permanent points of reference. For, from the miracles by faith the eschatological community is fed with the Revelation of God in Christ. To a modern world in existential estrangement from God the Christian must present the sign of a life lived in the world, in the gifts of the Spirit; these greater works from the fuller relationship of Christ to his people must make the world attentive so that it may arrive at the point of decision for belief or offence.

"If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin: but now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father . . . But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me: and ye also shall bear witness, because ye have been with me from the beginning." (John 15. 24, 26, 27).

WILLIAM JOHNSTONE.

A Meditation on Galatians 4. 4-6

But when the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father.

It was the Jewish calendar, with its tyranny of days and months and times and years to be observed, from which St Paul would have the Galatians feel themselves made free. But that was long ago: it is a light religious calendar that we churchmen sit to now, compared with this, and we sit to it lightly, too. How, then, shall St Paul speak to us to-day? . . . He speaks to us as to men who know, as well as any generation has known, the tyranny of time.

Day after day for some is measured by the clock, timing them in, timing them out. Blessed indeed, we think, is the man whose time, by contrast, is his own. But whose time *is* his own? Irretrievably day slips into day, month into month, remorselessly and irrevocably. We know, in short, that we are timed: we are concerned with time.

So, too, is the Bible concerned: witness the space given to "Time" in *A Theological Word Book of the Bible,* third only in its claims upon the reader's time to "God" and "Spirit". They tell us that the writers of the Scriptures saw time differently from ourselves. We measure it: they assessed it. For us, the chronometer: for them, the insight of the Preacher who measures time by moments of opportunity, distinguishing a time to be born from a time to die, a time to plant from a time to pluck up that which is planted. . . . Perhaps they did see time differently, these men. But then our generals tell us that timing is the essence of strategy; and did not our Francis Bacon observe that to choose time is to save time? Surely the wise men of all ages agree: the prudent man must be sensitive to time, and must seek to fill his moments with the content appropriate to the moment.

But, there, we have wandered far from St Paul, who will not begin

with a prudential maxim, although he might end with one. So here is not primarily advice, but the assertion of something done. "When the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law. . . ."

Time reached its fulness, time was fulfilled, when there entered into time the Son of the eternal God, himself eternal, to be comprehended in years and days and hours.

And since that time, then, I must see time through different eyes. How false, indeed, is now seen to be that spirituality which whispers, "It is the eternal, the time*less*, which is your spiritual concern." "Am I," I ask myself, "rather above trying to do the business of the day in the day? Do I consider punctuality insignificant?" The questions sound my spiritual insight. For my procrastination steals my own time, and my unpunctuality steals the time of others: yet time is taken seriously by God: the eternal has himself submitted to being timed.

Yet here we are back where we started. The world is surely only too well aware that it is timed. Our cry is rather that we have not time to do what we would do. So there is a characteristic figure of our age: and he is not an idle man, but a man always in a hurry. At no particular moment has he time, for one moment always eludes him, the most real moment, the moment of the present. To such a man the Son of God speaks from his own experience in time, for here, surely, was one who knew the ceaseless surge of claims upon his time. Yet always in the Gospels we see him in unhurried control of the present moment. *He* has time always: time for the paralytic let down (what unforgivable intrusion) through the roof: time in the milling entry into the city to notice a Zacchaeus: time in the thronging hustle to the cross to bid the daughters of Jerusalem think of themselves. Where was his secret?

He knew what it was, we must say, to discriminate among the claims upon his time. The world might be crying out for him, but his time must be given to training twelve men. Can it be that I am trying to do impossibly many things with my own time?

This, then, first. But his advice goes deeper, nor was there need for the eternal to enter time to tell us this. Rather it is this: the world is in such a fever and a fret because it has, precisely, no sense of the eternal offered it in time. Jesus had. His life speaks to us in this.

Life, to the world, is something rushing past, feverishly to be grasped, or for ever to be lost. For a moment the content of the moment may be salvaged, but in the next succeeding moment it will be swallowed up: so grasp it quickly. But with unerring insight the Son of God saw the eternal issue in the passing moment, and with unhurrying ease grasped the timeless given there in time.

What, then, is this thing, the eternal offered thus in the passing moment?

It is the will of God which is to be seen in and for that moment. Was it not by his acceptance, at every point, even at the point of the

Cross, of the Father's will that Jesus made real the eternal in the present moment? So, too, then, with us: whether we are conscious of God in the moment, whether its content is religious, as the world would use the word, or secular, it is as we find God's will for it that we touch the eternal God in it, and find the eternal present in our years and days and hours. This is what he would teach us who was sent forth in the fulness of time, made of a woman through a woman's simple acceptance of God's will.

We see, perhaps, the vision. To respond, that is another thing. For why? We lack one thing, the Lord's own love—his love of the eternal God, his Father: his love of the people whom God gave him to meet him moment by moment, this love that filled the moments of his time as God willed them to be filled, with God's eternal love for men. Such love is not in us.

But wait. This Son of God who came once into time but now is raised above time to the glory of the eternal Godhead, this risen and ascended Christ, this dear Son of God shall still be found in time, in your heart and in mine: and day by day, stupendous love, shall share with us his own loving observance of the will of his Father, seen now as our Father, too. Abba, Father, we may cry; or rather, the Spirit of his Son, sent into our hearts, shall cry.

So we come home at last to the thing from which this world takes its beginning in time and to which at the end of time it moves: home here and now to God's love, God's love come home to us. The gentle sundial I knew as a boy had in it as much of the essence of my time as my urgent clock, which yet I may not ignore:

Hours fly, flowers die, love stays.

Love stays. God has sent forth his Son. And so eternal love shall stay, closer indeed to us than to those who knew him in the timeless Galilean days, for he shall stay within our hearts. And staying so, he shall fulfil, as we will let him, our moments and our days, and so fulfilling us, deliver us from all the thronging press of time.[1]

P. K. Walker.

Training for the Mission

"When I was a parish clergyman it was generally said, and I think with substantial truth, that missions were superfluous in a well-worked parish, and mischievous in an ill-worked one." So wrote Bishop Hensley Henson in 1926, and the passage of thirty years has served to increase the number of people, clerical and lay, who would endorse the bishop's opinion.

Present-day doubts concerning the value of parochial missions do not, of course, spring from the belief that the proclamation of the

[1] The reader of Paul Tillich's haunting *The Shaking of the Foundations* and *The New Being* will not fail to have caught the echoes. The writer would acknowledge his debt, too, to Douglas Webster's remarks on "Limitation" in his evocative *In Debt to Christ* (pp. 115 f.).

Gospel is less urgently resuired in the 1960s than it was in the 1920s, nor are they entirely due to the fact that the old eight- or fifteen-day mission had little effect on those outside the Church's life. The real reason for scepticism can be traced to the current emphasis on "being the Church" rather than "going to church", and on the belief that a high-powered campaign of short duration tends to obscure the fact that the Church has a continuous mission which ought to be thought of and planned in terms of a century rather than in terms of one fortnight every ten years.

But if the evangelistic mission, so called, is on the way out, there is evidence that a Teaching Week can still serve a very useful purpose and, if adapted to modern circumstances, can be a very powerful way of equipping a congregation for its missionary task in the parish.

It was with this in mind that the vicar of a new housing area parish in Stockton-on-Tees, and the rector of a country town in the North Riding of Yorkshire got together some months ago to plan a Teaching Week to be held in the new area, where the Church is still young and its buildings only two years old.

From the outset it was decided that the teaching should be directed only at confirmed members of the Church and others who were already members of the congregation or had shown some signs of becoming so. The aim of the week was made equally clear; it was to provide the congregation with better equipment for its continuous mission to the parish.

It was, therefore, decided to throw the emphasis on the liturgical life of the Church, and try to indicate how this life impinges on the life of the community at large. In order to drive the various points home it was decided to base the teaching on a series of practical demonstrations in which members of the congregation could take part.

The project was entitled "The Christian Family Week" and the program developed on the following lines:

SUNDAY EVENING

Introductory address by the conductor on "The Church—the Family of God and the Body of Christ".

MONDAY EVENING

Subject: "Joining the Family."
Address on Christian Initiation.
Demonstration of Public Baptism, leading on to Confirmation and Holy Communion.

TUESDAY EVENING

Subject: "The Family in the Street."
Address on the House Church.
Demonstration of a House Meeting in session, followed by a demonstration House Communion. This was easily arranged by importing a certain amount of domestic furniture into the church.

WEDNESDAY EVENING

Subject: "The Family Meeting."
Address on the Parish Meeting and congregational responsibility.
Demonstration of a Parish Meeting with 30–40 people taking part in a discussion on a local schools' problem and a new church building project.

THURSDAY EVENING

Subject: "The Family Meal."
Address on the Holy Communion.
Demonstration of the Holy Communion with commentary.

FRIDAY EVENING

Subject: "The Family Health Service."
Address on the Ministry of Healing.
Demonstration of the Laying on of Hands, Holy Unction, and Sick Communion. This involved the arrangement of a bedroom scene at the front of the church, with a "patient" in bed and the vicar and members of the congregation arriving at the "house" to minister to him.
This was followed by a separate demonstration of the Sacrament of Penance.

SUNDAY MORNING

"The Family Worship"—the Holy Communion.

SUNDAY EVENING

Thanksgiving for the Teaching Week. The vicar of the parish, having taken over from the conductor, pointed to the main lessons of the week and their implications for the Church's mission to the parish.

The effects of the Teaching Week can, of course, only be measured over a long period. The teaching called for no revolution in parish policy, as this has always been based on Public Baptism, Parish Communion, Parish Meeting, House Church, etc. Rather did it serve to remind the congregation of the basis of its missionary life, and call upon the members of the congregation to engage in it more fully.

Attendance never fell below 200 and rose to nearly 350 at the Parish Communion on the Sunday. In addition, about 200 people attended the sixteen House Communions held during the course of the week. This was an encouraging response in a new artisan parish where overtime and family commitments are heavy.

There are already signs of a new awareness of what the twentieth-century Church is trying to be and to do, and of a greater sense of obligation to share in the apostolic mission in which the Church is now engaged.

Further experiments along these lines are, we believe, urgently needed.

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Training of the Clergy of the Church of England: is there an Alternative?

This article is written, with real respect for the efficiency and devotion of theological colleges, and only because it seems likely that an increasing number of ordination candidates will soon require more places than are available at present. Considerable expenditure will be necessary to modernize existing college premises and to build one or two new colleges would be costly. Their staffing and the salaries of Principals and Tutors are also matters of concern from two points of view, the supply of men of the requisite scholarship and the increase of their present salaries. Is it necessary that the system of training which came into vogue a hundred years ago should remain entirely uniform? And if an alternative method is readily available, should it not be tried?

The alternative is an open, rather than a closed, collegiate training, centred on our cathedrals. The cathedrals are the heart of the life of the Church of England, and their ordered worship maintains a central tradition which has the confidence and respect of the laity. They are staffed in the main by men of some distinction in scholarship or administration, who are not overwhelmed with diocesan responsibilities. Their daily worship is available; though faithfully maintained, the daily Eucharist, Mattins, and Evensong are sparsely attended on week-days, and the addition of a group of ordinands would be encouraging. Cathedral cities in most cases have an atmosphere of their own, conducive to a requisite detachment during training from the pressure of great centres of population; yet they normally contain a number of churches whose Vicars would welcome the assistance of ordinands, on Sundays at least, and would give opportunities of parochial experience and friendly counsel.

The problem of suitable tutors is easily solved. In every diocese there are men of proved scholarship who have little or no opportunity of passing on what they have learned. They could give, without much difficulty, one morning or afternoon a week to a section of the theological course on which they are expert, and would thoroughly enjoy their teaching, and benefit by some extra remuneration. On this system it is often possible to secure as tutors men of high attainments who would not wish to be candidates for full-time posts at our residential colleges.

All this is written from the experience of eight years in helping to establish a college for senior ordinands at Worcester, where our training is now officially recognized and has been commended and appreciated in high quarters. The work has brought me a conviction that its adaptation for ordinands of the normal age might well prove to be a valuable experiment, if one or two other cathedral bodies were willing to try.[1] Before the era of the theological colleges, the

[1] Since this article was written the advent of the Rochester college is a welcome development though in some aspects it differs from the lines here advocated.

method was not unknown, though the training elaborated by the colleges is now much more complete, and its merits would have to be reflected in parallel methods, unknown to such early and rather loosely knit experiments.

One vital matter is the establishment of a corporate life for the students. In Worcester this has been easy because of the existence of an admirable Church House Club which shares the Old Palace with diocesan offices. Lecture rooms, common meals, and club rooms are thus available: the only disadvantage is a necessary limitation of the number of students who can be taken. Similar facilities would be needed for any college of the same type; but they are available in some places, and rooms for lectures might easily be provided in a large Canonical house. It is essential that the men should spend a great part of the day together. Common meals might easily be arranged at a restaurant if necessary. The cathedral chapels would be available for prayer and meditation.

As to sleeping accommodation, and evening study, a panel of suitable lodgings can be formed; a collegiate building is therefore not necessary; as it is to-day, undergraduates at universities who cannot find places in colleges are well provided for in lodgings, and the effect of living out on their studies is not deleterious. Older men certainly benefit by the privacy of their evenings and change of atmosphere. And, young or old, candidates for ordination would feel a strong measure of responsibility for their private time during term.

One necessity of such a type of training would be the appointment of a Principal who could have the time and aptitude for holding together a group of twenty or so students and perhaps a dozen tutors, which in this more open type of training and without resident tutors might lack coherence. It should be possible to find a few such men, or even one, for a further experiment. Coherence is most important, but in a system such as I suggest there would be less likelihood of a party colour characterizing this type of college, and of such conformation to a type as was complained of by a speaker at the recent Church Assembly. There would be no need for a Dean and Chapter to become involved in a new responsibility except by their friendly interest, and to whatever extent certain members might wish. So far as my experience goes a fee slightly lower than that of most colleges is likely to prove adequate: but it is highly desirable that the diocese, and, one need scarcely say, its bishop, should have a considerable representation on the governing body and possibly contribute some financial support. The proposed experiment would require no capital expenditure and could begin with the next academic year.

As my experience in this work has been entirely with senior ordinands (*i.e.* men of forty or over), may I be permitted to conclude by testifying to the high qualities of character and experience which they usually bring to the ministry: they are a valuable reinforcement which will, I hope, be encouraged. They adapt themselves and learn uncommonly well, largely because they are so keen.

C. B. Armstrong.

CORRESPONDENCE

AN EXPERIMENT IN LINCOLNSHIRE

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

It occurs to me that the experiment in Lincolnshire which the Rev. A. C. Smith has so clearly described, goes a long way to meet a fundamental difficulty, hardly ever recognized, in the married curate's ministry.

I have always sensed that the married man, particularly in his first curacy, is something of an embarrassment to his bishop, and that there is a certain awkwardness in his status in the parish. In this, temperament and inexperience clearly play a big part, but I believe the malaise is traceable to something deeper. Bishops and theological college principals discourage their men from marrying, not because they dislike married priests, but because they know instinctively that married curates create problems in a parochial system of training adapted to their unmarried predecessors. For this system is based on the principle of one *persona* in the community.

Why does the married man not fit?

(*a*) He brings into the parish a home, and this is part of his ministry, something that he has to learn to use from the very beginning. This is rarely recognized, simply because there can only be one *persona* in any one community.

(*b*) He and his wife look forward instinctively to some permanence for their home life. That means that unless he can see five years or more of settled life ahead of him and his family, he cannot help thinking of the next step.

(*c*) If he has to learn to use his home, the people must be able to think of him as their parson, and of his house as the parsonage to which they resort. That means that he should be ordained to a semi-dependent charge.

In Lincolnshire all this seems to have been achieved. Is there anything really novel in this? After all, it is usual in other provinces of the Anglican Communion, notably in the U.S.A., for the clergy to have charge of mission churches from the start, under some form of supervision.

Men entering the ministry in their thirties or later, sacrifice a great deal, and in many cases have to deny their families that sense of permanence that married incumbents of the same age can take for granted. It would be worth much to the efficiency and the happiness of their ministry if unnecessary moves could be eliminated. I

believe the Lincolnshire experiment could equally well be applied in the cities in a modified form.

Yours faithfully,
ANTONY BELL.

GILLINGHAM,
THE VICARAGE FLAT,
DORSET.

EPISCOPACY AND INTERCOMMUNION

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Did I not know Canon Balmforth and his concern for the unity of the Church I might well have imagined that his letter in the January issue of THEOLOGY was written some forty years ago for, although his reading and contacts suggest otherwise to him, considerable evidence has been provided since that date to show that his suspicions that there is a vast cleavage of opinion between Anglicans and other Protestants about what we are doing at the table of the Lord are groundless.

The testimony of the joint report *Church Relations in England* (S.P.C.K., 1950) is easily accessible to all. Its reliability is demonstrated by many books and, among them, the Presbyterian D. M. Baillie's *The Theology of the Sacraments* (Faber, 1957), the Baptist Neville Clark's *An Approach to the Theology of the Sacraments* (S.C.M., 1956), the Congregationalist J. S. Whale's *Christian Doctrine*, Chapter VII (C.U.P., 1941), and the report *The Catholicity of Protestantism*, Chapter VI (Lutterworth, 1950).

Official confirmation of the views expressed in these works will be found in the liturgies of *The Book of Offices* (1936) of the Methodist Church and the *Ordinal and Service Book for use in the Courts of the Church of Scotland* (1931). The ordination rites of these two books can only be judged defective by those who disagree with Professor Ratcliff's assessment of the Ordinal of the Church of South India in the January issue of THEOLOGY.

All this evidence and more shows "something like a common mind" which would give "spiritual reality" to intercommunion. It cannot in honesty be ignored or lightly dismissed.

Yours sincerely,
C. W. J. BOWLES.

RIDLEY HALL,
CAMBRIDGE.

THE GOSPEL LECTION IN THE RITE OF INFANT BAPTISM

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

As Lady Oppenheimer has made reference to my article in her letter, I shall be glad if you will permit me to reply to her. I

agree that sound scholarship should be applied to our use of Holy Scripture. I am surprised, therefore, that your correspondent should rely entirely on a piece of unproven higher criticism to make her point.

I am aware that attempts have been made to show that Matt. 28. 19 ran "Baptizing them in the name of the Lord" in the original text; and it has been suggested that it was expanded by a later redactor to correspond with ecclesiastical custom. But none of our extant MSS supports this shorter reading. Neither can we infer from patristic evidence that the Trinitarian version is a later accretion. It is true Eusebius of Caesarea quotes the verse in the shorter form; but he also quotes the text in its full version when he needs it. It is reasonable to suppose that he abbreviated it to suit his convenience. Unless Lady Oppenheimer can produce MSS and patristic evidence to the contrary, I shall continue to maintain that the use of this lection "is fully in accord with primitive practice and sound liturgical principles".

Further, my contentions in this matter are supported by the fact that most of the historic rites of Christian Initiation, both in East and West, cite the Matthaean passage as the warrant for the dominical institution of Holy Baptism. Since most of these rites are of high antiquity, and may be traced back in their incipient forms to the primitive period, we may conclude that the *consensus fidelium* of historic and catholic Christianity has authenticated this passage.

Yours faithfully,
C. E. Pocknee.

Holy Trinity Vicarage,
Twickenham.

"AUTHOR OF LIFE DIVINE"

To the Editor of Theology.

Dear Sir,

Mr Hennell in your February number says that the A. and M. Committee did not check their references when they attributed this hymn to John Wesley and pays a tribute to Methodist efficiency. In our 1950 edition we decided to leave the name of John Wesley unchanged, since there is no evidence of authorship. *Hymns on the Lord's Supper* was issued in 1745 under the names of John and Charles Wesley. Except for those found in John's *Collection of Psalms and Hymns* (1737), it is left to the individual judgment on style, etc., to guess who wrote which. The present Methodist Hymnal allows only one original for certain to John (No. 794), and appears to limit his part to translations and adaptations of hymns by earlier writers.

W. K. Lowther Clarke,
Chairman of the Proprietors of
Hymns Ancient and Modern.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By Oscar Cullmann. S.C.M. Press. 1959. 42s.

Readers of THEOLOGY will have known that Dr Cullmann's greatest work was on its way: and now here it is—a course of lectures endlessly revised over twenty years and finally delivered in America in 1955—with all the learning, lucidity, and lack of pomposity that one associates with the author; well translated, well printed; and surely destined to be indispensable for the next twenty years.

Dr Vincent Taylor had introduced us to the possibility of examining the New Testament Christology by starting from a study of the names of Jesus, and his book of 1953, though much slighter than Cullmann's, actually deals with more of the honorific titles and is not now superseded. The method is certainly likely generally to commend itself to British students: it provides a firm and not an inferential basis on which to consider not only what significance each name held for the early Church but also whence they were all derived and whether, and in what sense, they were used by our Lord. Dr Cullmann's conclusions are conservative and there is hardly a chapter which does not refute some piece of Bultmannian scepticism, while the Conclusion rejects the alleged necessity at the present time of demythicization; for what is difficult is not really the biblical cosmology but the belief, equally difficult in the first century, that historical and dateable events should represent the centre of God's self-revelation. One feels that, for all Dr Cullmann's moderation of language, he must regard Dr Bultmann's views as a grave menace to the contemporary Church.

The Christology of the New Testament is divided into four main sections: there is, inevitably, overlapping, but for convenience the first discusses the titles Prophet, Suffering Servant, High Priest, which have reference primarily to the earthly work of Jesus; secondly come Messiah and Son of Man, which have reference to Jesus' future work; thirdly, *Kyrios* and *Soter*, which refer to Jesus' present work (i.e. his work as the living, exalted Christ whom the believer worships); fourthly, the Logos, the Son of God, and God absolutely, all of which indicate the pre-existence of Jesus.

Dr Cullmann maintains that the early Church believed in our Lord's Messiahship because it was convinced that Jesus himself believed he was the Messiah, and that he himself understood his mission by means of the ideas implied by such titles as Son of Man and Son of God; and although he did not himself use the actual title, Suffering Servant, he did from the moment of his baptism conceive of his vocation in terms of vicarious suffering and death and of the Servant's restoration of the covenant between God and his people. Unlike Bultmann and two recent English writers, Cullmann does not dispute that Isaiah 53 is the background of Mark 10. 45, and he sees no reason to contest its authenticity; and there Jesus

combines in a classical way the Servant and the Son of Man conceptions. Indeed, Cullmann claims a great deal for the Servant idea: it is, he says, one of the oldest answers to the question who Jesus is (it was especially used by Peter) and it opens for us most clearly the secret of Jesus' self-consciousness.

It is apparent that in Cullmann's view we can only understand the New Testament Christological problem by forgetting the debates of later generations about the doctrine of the Trinity and the natures of the Person of Christ. The New Testament is concerned not with essence but with function only. But more: "it is *only meaningful* to speak of the Son in view of God's revelatory action, not in view of his being", which raises an altogether bigger question. For it would seem that the author is not just restricting himself voluntarily to a consideration of the New Testament categories, but that he holds that the Church itself should be so restricted, just as in *Christ and Time* he trounced the "violent reductions and reinterpretations of the New Testament message" by the Alexandrian Fathers.

We may perhaps wonder whether it is possible entirely to combine loyalty to the biblical faith with a studied indifference to the fourth and fifth centuries. But at any rate we cannot doubt Cullmann's thesis that "the problem of Jesus in its full theological scope was recognized only in the light of the new events of his death on the cross and . . . his resurrection". What had been only dimly and discontinuously grasped at during the ministry was then at last understood, and it was the Church's worship that brought into a unity the several facets of the tradition. The Lord who was present in the Eucharist is identical with Jesus of Nazareth and with the Son of Man who will come on the clouds at the end of the eschatological interim time.

Wilfrid Browning.

Blackburn.

An Analytical Philosophy of Religion. By Willem F. Zuurdeeg. Allen and Unwin. 30s.

Our Experience of God. By H. D. Lewis. Allen and Unwin. 30s.

Christian Rationalism and Philosophical Analysis. By F. H. Cleobury. James Clarke. 15s.

The authors of these three books all address themselves to the same general problem. When men claim, as they persistently do, to have "known" God, what is it that they are asserting, and have their statements the kind of significance which makes them relevant to an understanding of both themselves and the world they live in? It is a problem of course which, in one shape or another, the philosophically-minded theologian has ever had to face, and its first tentative solution, within the Christian tradition, is to be traced back to Clement of Alexandria and even Justin Martyr. During the last thirty years, however, with the emergence of a radically revised conception of the nature and function of philosophy itself, it has assumed a new and more elusive form, and the question now is whether a properly rational treatment of the claims of religious

faith must not, once and for all, dispel the idea that religion offers, in any admissible sense, a mode or channel of knowledge without which human life is necessarily misconceived and disorientated. In other words, the believer, unwilling to allow that an experience alike of such widespread occurrence and of such magisterial importance for those who have it, can be no more than an emotional (or even volitional) attitude the self-rationalization of which impartial logical analysis is bound to destroy, is now more than ever conscious—if, that is, his faith is at all sensitive to the pressure of intellectual difficulties—of the need for a newly conceived apologetic that will take account of the facts of the experience itself and the ambiguities and obscurities of the language in which it has customarily been presented. What the contemporary apologist, therefore, is trying to do is at bottom perhaps no more than what, often enough, his predecessors had also attempted in face of objections differently framed, whilst at the same time admitting that recent advances in semantics and logical analysis seem to have made it impossible any longer to retain, for purposes of philosophical clarification, the kind of linguistic currency which the theologians and philosophers of a couple of generations ago unhesitatingly allowed as valid.

Dr Zuurdeeg is careful to point out, nevertheless, that his book is not an apologetic treatise but a text-book for the student, whether of philosophy or theology, and hopes that it will have the further effect of encouraging fruitful discussion between "those who respect Carnap and Feigl and have read some of Sartre, and those who admire Barth, Nygren, and the Niebuhrs". The author aims at being objective, in the sense of endeavouring to assess other people's convictions with a certain detachment rather than to preach or urge some pet thesis of his own. The method adopted derives—unusually—from both logical empiricism and existentialism, although Kierkegaard and Buber, Russell and Wittgenstein are barely so much as mentioned (for which the patient reader may or may not be thankful). The situation to be analysed is that of *Homo loquens,* Man-who-speaks; for the function of philosophy, in the writer's view, is exclusively that of analysing languages: it can tell us nothing about ultimate reality; it neither edifies nor informs; nor can it ascertain the "real" nature of good and evil, justice and injustice. A philosophy of religion therefore is simply (but no less than—the importance of the task is not to be underrated) analysis of religious language, and religious language is one of the languages which modern Western man speaks; though he also speaks other languages—a moral, for example, and those of various *Weltanschauungen* which are akin to it and along with which it is indeed best studied. It follows then that it is not the business of philosophy of religion to defend any specific form of Christian faith or even of religious conviction. Should we seek such convictions we must do so elsewhere than in philosophy. Questions and answers about the meaning of life and the nature of God are themselves perfectly "meaningful", but they belong to "a realm of meaning to be analysed by

philosophy and not to philosophy itself". Notwithstanding, the upshot of Dr Zuurdeeg's inquiry is no mere *tout entendre c'est tout pardonner*: it is compatible, he thinks, with some forms of Protestantism—"neo-Reformation theology, and a certain kind of liberalism"; perhaps, too, with a liberalized Catholicism and with Anglicanism, as well as more than one variety of humanism. But with "fundamentalism, orthodoxy, older liberalism, and all forms of metaphysics, Communism, Fascism, and other totalitarianisms" it is, he pronounces, incompatible.

Professor Lewis's book also is certainly not intended (and is not fairly to be described) as a piece of theological special pleading. The author is a professional teacher of philosophy and, like Dr Zuurdeeg, has the professed student in view. But he has no wish to disguise his purpose as that of a believer and apologist. His special concern is with the question "How are particular religious assertions justified?" rather than with that of the existence of God. Such assertions, in his opinion, cannot be established by philosophy, for (and here he agrees with the previous writer) the task of philosophy, as touching religion, is simply to explicate and clarify the nature and logical status of the beliefs which we happen actually to hold. Divine existence, accordingly, does not admit of proof, nor can it be brought within the bounds of a comprehensive rational system. The relevant theme is thus not God but man's experience of God and the relation of that experience to other human activities; and Professor Lewis treats it with an eloquence commensurate with his personal sympathies. The burden of his argument, the impressiveness of which is certainly undeniable for such as will share his own Christian standpoint, is that existence, the contingent, in all its modes relates to and is finally dependent upon an unconditioned or absolute reality of which, from the fact of our inevitable human limitations, we can have no positive knowledge other than our sense of its being unconditioned—a view that at once brings to mind Jaspers' statement that the question "What is Transcendence?" cannot be answered by a knowledge *of* Transcendence, or Marcel's, that when we speak of God it is not God of whom we are speaking. But the traditional "proofs" of divine existence, although logically they prove nothing, are not without point as the expression of an intuitive certitude which is not to be explained in terms of a series of rational inferences. On the other hand, Professor Lewis is no more tolerant of the claims of a non-mediated, "mystical" knowledge of God than was, say, Hastings Rashdall, who in other respects was at the opposite pole to our author. All such claims he considers to be preposterous. If the knowledge of God is real it must be mediated, and expressed, moreover, in symbolical language. What Professor Lewis has to say about religion and art—a subject that generally has received far less attention from theologians than its interest and importance merit—is worthy of careful consideration, since their obvious affinity illuminates the question of the *truth* of religion, which for him, as for every intellectually inquisitive reader, is paramount. For in religion as in art there is an ulterior quality of "meaningfulness" of which

the verbal or visible content actually manifested—the particular symbolic utterance—is never wholly exhaustive, even though apart from the symbolism it cannot be conveyed at all. Lastly, upon man's ethical experience, Professor Lewis follows Moore and W. D. Ross in maintaining the objectivity of morals. To believe in morals, he reminds us, one doesn't have to believe in God. "We should rejoice in the fact when common ground is found for atheists or agnostics and religious believers"; and this ground is much wider than we are usually willing to suppose. Even to affirm that God is "good" requires that "good" be given some meaning not expressly derived from "God". As a contribution to the philosophical discussion of religious problems the present volume is one of the best to have come from the pen of a British writer for some years.

The tradition of Rashdall—and the late F. R. Tennant—has however a continuator in Dr Cleobury who, though thoroughly conversant with the contemporary philosophical situation, sees no reason why the Devil should have all the best tunes, and puts up a spirited defence of Christian rationalism as against the position adopted by, for example, Professor Braithwaite in his now-famous (or notorious) Eddington lecture. He is enough of an existentialist to prefer the "realism" of the language of personal relations to that of scientific description, but proceeds thence to argue the existence of God as Christian theism has conceived it. This he does with much acuteness, and those already disposed to accept his beliefs will doubtless applaud his reasoning. Yet, as with all such attempts, the less sympathetic reader is likely to feel that the ultimate conclusions were only, in fact, the initial assumptions.

B. M. G. Reardon.

Parham Rectory,
Pulborough.

Divine Poetry and Drama in Sixteenth-Century England. By Lily B. Campbell. Cambridge University Press. 1959. 35s.

This is (as one would expect) a scholarly book, essential to the serious student, but fascinating to anyone who is accustomed to poetry and drama, and can appreciate them as means by which men have uttered the promptings of God the Holy Spirit. The author takes for a main theme the development of scriptural and divine poetry and drama in the sixteenth century as a counterblast to the secular (and often frivolous, blasphemous, and obscene) verse narratives, poems, and plays, including the Roman plays so beloved of medieval schoolmasters; and as a means of education in the vernacular for the mass of uneducated folk. "By my counsell and advyse," says Erasmus, "the ploughman and husbandeman of the countrey shall reade scrypture, the carpenter, the smyth, the mason, yea and harlottes also, and bawdes shall reade it and to be shorte, the Turkes also shall reade it. If Chryst dyd not kepe suche away from his owne voyce, I wyll not stop theym and kepe theym away from his bokes." Tyndale cries out for men to read the Bible instead of the ballads of Hercules and Robin Hood, and the movement started by Savonarola springs to life in England in countless holy ballads,

hymns, and plays; greatly varying in merit, but having the same intention, and building up the same influence. In Miss Campbell's book every aspect seems to be recorded with a wealth of scholarly (but never obtrusive) reference. One of her striking achievements is the synopsis (between pp. 199–257) of seven of the divine plays.

Part of the attraction of the book is the delightful series of quotations. Here is Thomas Nashe describing a play "filthily acted" by schoolboys: "Another flong his armes lyke cudgels at a peare tree, insomuch as it was mightily dreaded that he wold strike the candles that hung above their heades out of their socketts, and leave them all darke. Another did nothing but winke and make faces. . . . The onely thing they did well, was the prodigall childs hunger, most of their schollers being hungerly kept; & surely you would have sayd they had bin brought up in the hogs academy to learne to eate acorns, if you had seene how sedulously they fell to them." If nothing else, a reward for reading this book is to find this divine sonnet of Henry Constable:

> Greate God! within whose symple essence wee
> Nothyng but that which ys thy self can fynde:
> When on thy self thou dyddst reflect thy mynde,
> Thy thought was God, which tooke the forme of Thee;
> And when this God, thus borne, thou lov'st, and Hee
> Lov'd thee agayne with passion of lyke kynde,
> (As lovers syghes which meet, become one mynde,)
> Both breath'd one spryght of aequall Deitye.
> Aeternal Father! whence theis twoe doe come
> And wil'st the tytle of my father have,
> A heavenly knowledge in my mynde engrave,
> That yt thy Sonne's true image may become,
> And sente my hart with syghes of holy love,
> That yt the temple of thy Spryght may prove.

Perhaps not since Bishop Charles Wordsworth's time have critics and readers of Shakespeare been so well aware as they are to-day of the religious quality of his mind, and the Christian attitude of his plays. Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter's Tale, and The Tempest are all capable (if no more) of bearing a religious interpretation; and it is difficult to believe in the casual agnosticism of the man who wrote:

> Sure, He that made us with such large discourse—
> Looking before and after—gave us not
> That capability and god-like reason,
> To fust in us unused.

or

> Those holy fields
> Over whose acres walk'd those blessed feet,
> Which fourteen hundred years ago were nailed
> For our advantage on the bitter cross.

or

> Why, all the souls that were were forfeit once;
> And He that might the vantage best have took
> Found out the remedy. How would you be,
> If He, which is the top of judgment, should
> But judge, as you are?

This fine book will help us better to appreciate some of the influences which must have helped to mould the genius of the young Shakespeare.

H. C. A. Gaunt.

Winchester College.

Vous Serez Comme des Dieux. By Gustave Thibon. Paris: Fayard. 750 francs.

The French Roman Catholic moralist, whose last book, *Notre Regard qui manque à la lumière* (1955), contained admirable and lasting words on love and marriage, has now for the first time composed a drama. He has imagined characters inhabiting a future from which our mortality has been banished by scientific discovery. This essentially fantastic postulate is one among others equally inadmissible. Children can be and are produced in the laboratory, but they may also be and are born as they are now. If children go on coming into the world when nobody grows old and nobody need die, the prospect of famine takes on alarming proportions. The prospect is not mentioned. Indeed, it is ignored so thoroughly that at one point in the play there is talk of reviving all the dead that ever were. The heroine was the earliest human being to be born deathless. Yet it is she in particular, and not her father and mother (who were originally doomed to the grave and only in maturity underwent the ray treatment that made their lives unending) who is visited by thoughts of heaven and anticipates early death. But the main stumbling-block in the way of suspension of disbelief here is the assumption that at any imaginable time human life might be produced through the successful application of a formula, as you make pancakes or develop photographs.

I am not sure that this does not ruin M. Thibon's lively apologue as soon as it is analysed. In being merely read, it is vivid and absorbing. But if a reader is to assimilate the underlying argument, he must thereupon go over the speeches again page by page, and it is then that absurdity keeps on breaking in. The author was not oblivious to the risk he ran. As he says in the preface, his object was not to devise a stage situation nor to depict character nor to achieve verisimilitude in the evocation of to-morrow. It seemed to him that theatrical fiction was the most suitable literary form in which not to solve but to state a problem exclusively metaphysical and religious. The question is whether those whom he looks upon as heretics will be led to hearken.

From the beginning his Amanda is a quiet and reflective girl, in contrast to her friend, the space-travelling Stella, and to her own brother, constantly running off to the latest fashionable entertainment. That is to say, Amanda is predestined to recover her soul when all have lost theirs, to call upon God after mankind has reduced God to silence, to be quickened by grace, to go into a physical decline, and to sigh for the mystery of the eternal life which can only be reached through the gateway of death. She infects her lover with her spiritual combination of unrest and serenity, and the two

of them thus have successive occasions to cross dialectical swords with Dr Weber, the magician in scientist's garb, who can bring persons into existence by correctly assembling the atoms of which he holds them solely to consist.

There, in M. Thibon's intention, is where the drama lies, there the starkness of his problem. He finds that on the Continent Christians of the political left—progressive Christians, he calls them—have come to see in the triumph of socialism the fulfilment of the Gospel. He thinks they read the Gospel astigmatically. He thinks they fail to understand that the world could only be rid of hunger, cold, disease, servitude, and boredom at the price of our losing the distinction between to have and to be, at the price of our farewell to aspiration. Why make nothing impossible to science, he asks, if it means making nothing desirable to us? Our souls are at stake, for terrestrial permanence must be incompatible with our being, any of us, born anew.

It will be evident that M. Thibon in his own way echoes Miss Hannah Arendt in America, Professor Josef Pieper and Monsignore Romano Guardini in Germany. He is positive that Christianity now stands at the crossroads. Let it go whither it is being beckoned, and it will cease to be a religion. It will turn into the pretext of material abundance. The sense of mystery and wonder will dissolve. Contemplation will become unknown. It will be as Simone Weil forecast: everybody in hell will fancy he is in heaven.

PETERBOROUGH. MONTGOMERY BELGION.

SHORTER NOTICES

SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE SPIRITUAL LIFE. By St Peter Damian. Translated by Patricia McNulty. Faber and Faber. 21s.

THE LADDER OF DIVINE ASCENT. By St John Climacus. Translated by Archimandrite Lazarus Moore. Faber and Faber. 25s.

THE FIRST SPIRITUAL WRITERS. By Fr Cayré, A.A. Burns and Oates. 7s. 6d.

Reprinting classics of the spiritual life may seem at first sight a doubtfully useful venture. Can monks of the seventh and eleventh centuries speak to our condition, and if not are not their writings merely of antiquarian interest, to be left to the scholars, while we seek contemporary wisdom from the latest paper-back? Certainly John Climacus and Peter Damian are forbidding material, yet one remembers the tribute paid by Tillich to the "monastic theologians, who analysed themselves and the members of their small community so penetratingly that there are few present-day insights into the human predicament which they did not anticipate".

The Ladder of Divine Ascent is a product of the Eastern Church in the seventh century, written by "Abbot John of Sinai". The extant MSS in Greek, Syriac, and Slavonic bear witness to the influence of the work in the East. The present new translation is by Archimandrite Lazarus Moore. The teaching of the book is concerned with

the thirty steps to the achievement of "Holy Quiet"—as the writer names the state of contemplative union. The steps are concerned with the achievement of virtue as well as the spiritual directions concerning states of prayer. There is a wealth of shrewd discernment and advice which may speak to our own condition. "He whose will and desire in conversation is to establish his own opinion, even though what he says is true, should recognize that he is sick with the devil's disease." "Fire and water are incompatible: so is judging others in one who wants to repent." Against this point of contact, however, one must set the savage physical discipline of which the writer wholeheartedly approved. He describes with satisfaction the Belsen-scenes in the monastery penitentiary—of those who impose their own penances, he exclams: "I found so much pleasure in their grief that I forgot myself and was wholly rapt in mind and could not contain myself."

The same asceticism pervades the writing of St Peter Damian. A powerful influence in the business of the Church in the eleventh century, his heart was set upon the eremitic life. St Benedict, he points out, had called his Rule "a rule for beginners"—the monastic life, he argues, is therefore to be perfected in solitude. The needs of the Church drew him back from time to time; he was bishop and cardinal and employed in legatine work. "My mind, overshadowed by the darkness of worldly affairs, endeavours in vain to reach the heights of contemplation." He, too, has some hard sayings for a twentieth-century mind: "St Peter wiped out the stain of his marriage in the blood of his martyrdom," would not be widely acceptable as a comment on matrimony. From him, however, we can make an anthologist's choice of wise sayings. His invection against instability, morbus vagationis, applies as much to the fleeting incumbent of our day as to the wandering ascetic of his. But are these simply a meagre harvest to be sought amongst a waste of unadjusted asceticism? None would suggest Climacus or Peter Damian is a detailed guide for the spiritual life. They are men of their own age and not ours; but against that background they stand as men utterly convinced of the priority of the spiritual world. As a result it is the totality of their outlook which we need to appreciate. It presents a stirring contrast to much modern spiritual writing.

Fr Cayré's little book on *The First Spiritual Writers* is marred by the fact that he comes to the Fathers with a ready-made set of questions to be answered, chief among them the question of obedience to the See of Rome. On this point he is prepared to overstate his conclusions: "St Irenaeus reminded the West that this catholicity and apostolicity was, in fact, realized by union with the Church of Peter, which is in Rome." Irenaeus, in fact, says that every church must needs agree with the tradition and creed of the church founded by the two most glorious apostles, Peter and Paul (*Adv. Haereses*, III, ii). This is clearly less than Fr Cayre's finds. It is no good putting the Fathers into the witness-box to ask what you do in a divided church, because for them the situation had not arisen. Elsewhere his twentieth-century preconceptions make him play down the clear state-

ments of the Fathers. Against their overt notion of incorporation into the life of the Trinity, he has the more cautious notion that the "outpouring of the Spirit means sharing in a high degree in the Divine life itself". The book may suffer from translation, otherwise why are St Patrick and Pelagius described as "Bretons"? The printer also seems to have erred in describing the author's previous patristic work as "A Manual of Pathology"!

M. G. Hare Duke.

Bury.

Reality, Reason, and Religion. By Arthur Anton Vogel. Longmans. 30s.

From Religion to Philosophy. By F. M. Cornford. Harper. $1.35.

The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. By Josiah Royce. Harper. $1.75.

The re-issue as Harper Torchbooks of a number of important nineteenth- and early twentieth-century works on the philosophy of religion readily suggests comparison with newly published volumes in terms of Then and Now. The impression conveyed by reading the three works here reviewed is not so simple: if one were unaware of their original dates of publication, one might easily place the works by Cornford and Royce "Now", the former for its lucidity and freedom from metaphysical presupposition, the latter for its engagement with the deep-seated anxiety of modern man, the fear that all alleged truths are merely relative. Vogel, on the other hand, deliberately sets out to rehabilitate the Aristotelian-Thomist approach to reality, reason, and religion; in his first five chapters he takes us back to a type of metaphysical argument with which those trained in the linguistic school will find themselves ill at ease, especially in its treatment of one of the main themes, causation.

There are of course plenty of clues to the true dating of these books. Cornford sometimes falls into the assumption so frequently made in his generation that to disclose the origins of a system of thought is *ipso facto* to decide the question of its validity. Royce is dated by his style, which often turns to apostrophe ("O man, what is this thy daily life!" (p. 468)). Vogel is concerned to relate his reassessment of metaphysical explanation to the serious attack made on its validity by the Positivists. Yet the judgment persists that Cornford and Royce have more to offer for "Now" than has Vogel.

Vogel's later chapters, in which he draws out some religious implications of his metaphysical position, have many valuable comments on the failure of some critics to appreciate elements in the classical tradition which may fairly be called "existential" in the modern as well as the classical sense of the word. His thesis in this section may be summed up in a sentence from p. 195—"in the best thought of the classical tradition there never was to be found the complete abandonment of dynamism to staticism that much criticism seems to infer". In the final chapter Vogel attempts to rebut Tillich's charge that the classical tradition offers for our worship only a dead God.

Yet one is still dogged by two questions raised by the earlier works. Vogel admits and attempts to render acceptable the fact "that the concept 'being' . . . is afflicted with a lack of conceptual clarity in its own meaning" (p. 133). He succeeds in making a plausible case against the Positivist demand for universal clarity; but one is troubled by a suspicion that the concept "being" and the classical tradition in which it is involved should be investigated not only in terms of conceptual structure but also on the lines of Cornford's sociological study of Greek religion and philosophy. Origins do not determine validity, but they are relevant to its determination (cf. particularly Cornford's chapter on "The Datum of Philosophy"). Royce (as indeed does Tillich) leaves one asking whether the classical tradition, for all its flexibility and capacity to embrace dynamism, offers the best means for the appprehension of what both Royce and Vogel holds as a fundamental tenet—"that basically, and in its nature, intellection is ordained to truth" (Vogel, p. 75) .

In the chapter on "God and Free Will", for instance, Vogel develops a criticism of the traditional Thomistic doctrine of physical premotion, a criticism designed to show that "it saves the fact of a free creature entirely dependent on God more by a negative description than by a positive conceptual explanation of the fact in question. Apart from a statement of the apparent fact from which the theory takes its origin, further positive recommendation of the theory seems to be lacking" (p. 160). Vogel holds that the theory is bound to lack "positive and conceptually clarifying explanatory power" simply because it is about God; for since "God has no essence distinct from His existential act, this is the one case in which we can neither demand nor expect clear, univocal, conceptual knowledge of what God formally is or how God is interrelated to us and to creatures generally" (p. 177).

Can Vogel's general thesis do anything more for our grasp of the concept of being than physical premotion does for our grasp of God's relation to our free will? Granted that "the basic core of existence" may not be "of the order of forms which allow intellectual abstraction" (p. 121), Vogel is committed to the view that we have a concept, albeit "improper" (p. 133), of existence and being. Of this "improper" concept as of physical premotion one feels that there has been insufficient recognition of the fact that formal, conceptual noncontradiction is not to be mistaken for conceptual explanatory power.

M. H. Cressey.

Coventry.

The First Systematic Theologian: Origen of Alexandria. By H. T. Kerr. Princeton Theological Seminary. 50 cents.

In this 40-page brochure Dr Kerr portrays Origen as a theologian, and he does well since for some time the mystical and exegetical aspects of Origen's work have been so much emphasized that his properly theological achievements have been obscured. Origen was undoubtedly a great spiritual writer and a remarkable exegete, but

he was also a theologian of outstanding genius. We are grateful to Dr Kerr for recalling this fact.

Kerr shows first that Origen's supreme achievement was to prove that Christianity could hold its own intellectually with any other system of thought and so he won for it the respect of intellectuals. Dr Prestige had already made this observation: "If there had been no Origen, it may be seriously doubted whether the rising forces of obscurantism might not have blocked the entrance of Christianity against the genius of Augustine. A degenerate Christianity might well have found its leadership committed exclusively to illiberal imitators of Jerome and illiterate echoes of Bernard" (*Fathers and Heretics*, p. 64).

It was then Origen's greatness to have believed in the value of intelligence and to have expressed the Christian faith in a coherent and systematic form. He wanted to lay philosophy under service for the understanding of the faith. And this was a legitimate undertaking. Thomas Aquinas did no more than carry it further. But did Origen succeed? In his attempt to marry the Bible with philosophy, was he not led into deforming the biblical message so as to adapt it to philosophical ideas? Kerr shows that this is indeed what happened. Certainly there is more in Origen's system than a purely philosophical construction, but it may not be regarded as a valid interpretation of the Christian faith. In this sense, "it may be said that the Church of later generations was guided by a true instinct in rejecting Origen" (p. 41).

Jean Daniélou.

Paris.

Educational Ideals in the Ancient World. By William Barclay. Collins. 1959. 21s.

Here in more permanent form are the 1957 Kerr lectures. The style of the lecture room is preserved, but the lectures themselves have been much amplified. Of the six chapters, probably that most interesting to Christians will be the first, on Education among the Jews: the writer has here collected information not easily available elsewhere, and introduces us to the unfamiliar atmosphere of a Jewish home. It is admirably illustrated with quotation from Scripture and Rabbinic Midrash. The ideal is unequivocally education of children for God.

The ruthlessly hard, military training of Sparta exercised a fascination on foreigners from a laxer, more liberal and comfortable tradition: it built up a name for itself like our public schools in days of Stalky and Co. Its ideal was the complete subordination of the individual to the State, or rather to his class in the State.

On Schools of Hellas, K. J. Freeman's book published 1907 is still the best account, and Mr Barclay acknowledges his debt by frequent reference to it in his chapter on Athenian education; "its fault was that it remembered culture and forgot duty".

The Roman ideal is portrayed at its highest in Quintilian, who

influenced the form that schools in Europe were later to take. The Romans were the first nation to base their culture on the study of a literature in a foreign language. Quintilian's aim was the training of the orator. For Christians under the Empire education was rooted in the home. Christian families made use of pagan schools—they did not attempt to set up Church Schools. The Christian attitude to pagan culture is traced in the Fathers, and the conflict with Julian very well described. In the final chapter on the child in the Early Church the terribly austere and unnatural program of Jerome for the upbringing of Paula and Pacatula and the rather less formidable program of Chrysostum are described—each of them rather excessively directed against sexual temptation.

This is a very well documented, very readable book on a theme of perennial interest: it may not point the way to the solution of many of our present dilemmas, but it gives in easily accessible form the thought and practice of great cultures in the past on Education.

Ronald Lunt.

King Edward's School,
Birmingham.

Christianity and Money. By Jacques Leclercq. Translated by Eric Earnshaw Smith. Faith and Fact Books: 59. Burns and Oates. 7s. 6d.

With the rest of our society the average Christian is a slave to money. He is uncomfortably aware that all is not well, and wishes desperately to have his conscience put at rest by some smooth words. This book does not provide smooth words. It states that there is a distinctively Christian attitude to money, which is contrary to the accepted standards of the world. Two simplifications of the problem are disposed of—the double standard of precepts and counsels, and the purely social approach which reads class conflict into the Gospels.

The first part of the book deals with the matter from the individual angle. The essence of Christianity is total dependence on God, but money and possessions are a constant temptation to place one's trust elsewhere.

The second part deals with the social aspect. The man who wants to succour Christ to-day by succouring the poor must do so by social means. The present confusion in social thought is because the views of Christian social philosophy have been stated only in an occasional form in relation to the errors of liberal capitalism, marxism, and socialism. The most original contribution of Christianity in this sphere is in its doctrine of the right of ownership for all as a moral necessity to personal development.

Pungent and controversial things are said, which open up deeper levels in the debate on money and materialism, which is one of the most urgent spiritual debates of our time.

Margaret Kane.

Sheffield.

BOOK NOTES

Messrs Skeffington have published *The Bible Companion,* which is justly described as "a complete pictorial and reference guide to the people, places, events, background, and faith of the Bible". It is edited by William Neil, who has enlisted a strong team of contributors. There are over 500 pages of text (in double columns) and illustrations. It is finely produced, and the price (42s.) is very modest. It will be especially valuable to Christian parents and teachers: and it will also make an excellent prize or present for older boys and girls. Messrs T. and T. Clark have produced a new edition of Williston Walker's *A History of the Christian Church* (42s.): it has been revised by C. C. Richardson, Wilhelm Pauck, and R. T. Handy. It is one of the most serviceable single-volume histories of the Church, and is now assured of a new lease of life. *The Church Quarterly Review* (January–March 1960) has an article by Dr A. R. Winnett, entitled "Were the Deists 'Deists'?", in which he calls in question the common attribution to the so-called Deists of the eighteenth century of the doctrines of philosophical Deism, i.e. an absentee God, etc. He might have cited as an example Dr S. C. Carpenter's epigram: "Genesis relates that God rested on the seventh day from all His work. The Deists may be said to have extended this week-end indefinitely" (*Eighteenth-Century Church and People,* p. 117). *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* (October 1959) has articles by W. L. Warren on Simon Sudbury, by M. D. Knowles on Jean Mabillon, by J. D. Walsh on Joseph Milner's Evangelical Church History, and by P. J. Welch on the Revival of Convocation (1852–5). Two more "Faith and Fact" books from Messrs Burns and Oates are *What is an Angel?* by P.-R. Régamey, O.P., and *Evolution: hypotheses and problems* by Rémy Collin (7s. 6d. each). Messrs T. and T. Clark have produced a new edition of Martin Buber's influential book, *I and Thou* (9s. 6d.): Professor Gregor Smith, the original translator, has provided a new preface, and Professor Buber himself a postscript in which he answers some questions that have been asked about the meaning of his teaching. Ronald Knox's translation of *Autobiography of a Saint: Thérèse of Lisieux* (reviewed in THEOLOGY, November 1958) has now appeared as a Fontana book; so has H. E. Fosdick's *The Meaning of Prayer* (Collins, 2s. 6d. each). *A Prayer Book Dictionary* by Richard Tatlock (Mowbray, 3s. 6d.) is a useful little book, containing as it does explanations of obsolete, unusual, and ambiguous words. *Holy Communion* by Massey H. Shepherd, Jr, is a Seraph book (S.P.C.K., 6s.): it is a fine selection of short passages from Christian writers, ancient and modern, suitable for meditation before or after communion. Some of the passages might also be read aloud as "communion paragraphs" at early celebrations. *How to Conduct Retreats* (A.P.R., 2s. 6d.) is the report of a conference at which papers were read by the Archbishop of York, the Abbot of Nashdom, and other authorities on the subject. The papers are printed together with an abstract of the discussions which they provoked.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: R. Osborn, *Humanism and Moral Theory* (18s.); James K. Feibleman, *Religious Platonism* (25s.).

BEREAN PRESS: William Robinson, *What Churches of Christ Stand For* [4th edition] (3s.); William Robinson, *The Administration of the Lord's Supper* [first published in 1947; see review in THEOLOGY, September 1948, pp. 348 f.] (2s. 6d.).

BURNS AND OATES: Solange Lemaître, *Hinduism* (7s. 6d.); Jean de Fabrègues, *Christian Marriage* (7s. 6d.).

GEOFFREY CHAPMAN: J. Calvet, *Louise de Marillac* (18s.); The Community of St Séverin, *Confession* (10s. 6d).

CHICAGO UNIVERSITY PRESS (C.U.P.): Mircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitagawa

(Eds), *The History of Religions* (40s.); Van Meter Ames (Ed.), *Beyond Theology* (37s. 6d.).

CHRISTIAN LITERATURE SOCIETY: K. J. Saunders, *Gotama Buddha* (Re. 1.50).

CHURCH INFORMATION OFFICE: Quentin Edwards, *What is Unlawful?* (1s. 6d.); Alfred Torrie, *The Middle-Aged Man* (1s. 6d.).

T. AND T. CLARK: Robert E. Hume, *The World's Living Religions* (21s.).

COLLINS: Gerald Vann, O.P., *To Heaven with Diana* (16s.); Michael de la Bedoyère, *François de Sales* (18s.).

DARTON, LONGMAN AND TODD: Basil Minchin, *Every Man in his Ministry* (16s.); C. J. Dumont, O.P., *Approaches to Christian Unity* (25s.); B. C. Butler, *Why Christ?* (10s. 6d.).

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS (C.U.P.): John Wild, *Human Freedom and Social Order* (37s. 6d.).

EVANS (EASTGATE STREET, CAERNARVON): G. O. Williams, *The Church's Work* (6s.).

FAITH PRESS: Austin Farrer, *Said or Sung* (16s.).

HODDER AND STOUGHTON: Owen Brandon, *The Battle for the Soul: aspects of religious conversion* (4s. 6d.).

LIBRAIRIE PROTESTANTE (PARIS): René-Jacques Lovy, *Les Origines de la Réforme Française: Meaux 1518–1546* (n.p.).

LONGMANS: Harold Blair, *The Ladder of Temptations* (7s. 6d. and 4s.); J. V. Langmead Casserley, *Christian Community* (21s.).

LUTTERWORTH PRESS: John Line, *The Doctrine of the Christian Ministry* (25s.).

MOWBRAYS: Eric G. Jay, *Friendship with God* (5s.); Henry Chadwick (Ed.), *St Ambrose: On the Sacraments* (6s.); *God and the Universe* (4s. 6d.); *Prophets for our World* (4s. 6d.); Leo Sherley-Price, *St Francis of Assisi* (15s.); William of St Thierry, *The Mirror of Faith* (6s.).

NATIONAL MARRIAGE GUIDANCE COUNCIL: *The £ s. d. of Marriage; All about your Wedding; Starting your Family* (2s. 6d. each).

NATIONAL SOCIETY: *The Content of Agreed Syllabuses and Biblical Scholarship To-day* [report of a committee] (1s.); J. A. Wainwright, *The Role of Church Training Colleges for Teachers* (2s.).

OLIVER AND BOYD: Paul Althaus, *The So-called Kerygma and the Historical Jesus* (9s. 6d.).

ST THOMAS PRESS (TEXAS): T. Robert Ingram, *Lambeth, Unity and Truth* ($1.50).

S.C.M. PRESS: Kenneth Cragg, *Sandals at the Mosque* (12s. 6d.); Rudolf Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (6s.); Ethelbert Stauffer, *Jesus and His Story* (12s. 6d.); Helmut Gollwitzer, *The Dying and Living Lord* (5s.); A Religious of the C.S.M.V., *This is Life: A Book for the Busy* (8s. 6d.); David L. Edwards, *A Great Gospel for a Great Day* (2s.).

SHEED AND WARD: Robert Gleason, S.J., *The World to Come* (12s. 6d.).

SKEFFINGTON: G. W. H. Lampe, *I Believe* (18s.).

S.P.C.K.: Carroll E. Simcox, *Is Death the End?* (4s. 6d.); T. A. Roberts, *History and Christian Apologetic* (25s.); E. Allison Peers, *Studies of the Spanish Mystics*, Volume 3 (32s. 6d.); A. E. J. Rawlinson, *The Anglican Communion in Christendom* (6s. 6d.).

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (O.U.P.): Arthur F. Wright, *Buddhism in Chinese History* (25s.).

VALLENTINE, MITCHELL: Rabbi Moses Cordovero, *The Palm Tree of Deborah* (18s.).

VERLAGSHANDLUNG DER ANSTALT (BETHEL): Martin Gerhardt and Alfred Adam, *Freidrich von Bodelschwingh* (13.50 DM.).

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS (O.U.P.): W. A. Christian, *An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics* (48s.).

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